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Radical constructivism
Radical constructivism has an answer –
But this answer is not an easy one 
Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. • Boise State University • ddykstra@boisestate.edu
> context • In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is 
not mainstream. > Problem • Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections 
does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also 
suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the 
signals with which we attempt to communicate. How can we in radical constructivism enable those outside of RC to 
understand our explanation of human knowing? > method • Examine our understanding of radical constructivism 
itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings 
of their experiential worlds. > Results • We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they 
cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their 
revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. > implications • Since radical 
constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to 
the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical 
constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies 
consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work 
at hand. > Key words • History of science, paradigm change, physics education research, realism, folk theory of teach-
ing, cognitive equilibration.
… it seems to me that the resistance [met by 
Vico, Piaget and Ceccato] is not so much 
due to inconsistencies or gaps in [radical 
constructivism’s] argumentation as to the 
justifiable suspicion that constructivism 
intends to undermine too large a part of 
the traditional view of the world.
Ernst von Glasersfeld (1984: 17)
introduction
The term “answer” in the title of this 
paper does not refer to an answer to the re-
alists’ objections in order to convince them 
they have lost the debates. instead, it refers 
to an answer as to why our efforts to respond 
to realists in these debates seem to be so in-
effective and an answer as to what we should 
be doing instead. as the subtitle suggests, 
this is not an easy answer. it is an answer 
that we in radical constructivism (rC) have 
available to us for use in our efforts, if we 
wish to have realists at least understand our 
position.
This paper addresses two questions 
raised by the guest editors in their editorial.
  Why are the advantages of rC not strong 
enough to convince more scientists and 
philosophers? 
  Can the objections to rC be refuted in 
a way that makes rC more attractive to 
scientists and philosophers?
Both questions are asking why a disap-
pointingly small change in understanding 
rC has happened. in short, why is rC not 
more mainstream? rC itself offers a way of 
understanding why scientists and philoso-
phers have not joined our ranks, but not if 
we take the propositions given in the edito-
rial as defining rC at face value:
1 | Knowledge is not passively received, but 
is learnt through a process of active con-
struction by the knower. 
2 | The function of this process of learn-
ing is adaptive, and serves the knower’s 
organization of her own experiential 
world, not the discovery of an objective-
ly existing ontological reality. 
if we are going to take two basic propo-
sitions to define rC, then we need proposi-
tions that are more at the root of rC.
The first principle obviously gives rise to 
the label “constructivism,” but this proposi-
tion is a consequence of a more fundamental 
issue. When we miss the more fundamental 
issue, we may fail to deploy the strength of 
rC as an explanation of our world.
Why does knowledge have to be con-
structed and why cannot it be passively re-
ceived? Because the knowledge referred to 
here is our conceptions of how and why the 
world around us works, in short our work-
ing explanation of the world. Following Max 
Jammer (1957: 2–4), this knowledge can 
be called “explanatory knowledge,” as op-
posed to experiential knowledge. a funda-
mental principle in rC is that explanation 
exists only in the mind. We construct such 
knowledge in our minds. This constructed 
explanatory knowledge does not exist in any 
physical way in the world around us in any 
form that we can directly experience. Piaget 
put it in these ways at various times:
“ Knowledge is not a copy of reality. to know an 
object, to know an event, is not simply to look at 
it and make a mental copy or image of it. to know 
an object is to act on it.” (Piaget 1964: 177)
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“ it is clear there is an undeniable role played by 
experience in cognitive development; however, 
the influence of experience has not resulted in a 
conception of knowledge as a simple copy of out-
side reality.” (Piaget 1972: 8)
“ to understand is to invent.” (Piaget 1976)
The first proposition is merely a conse-
quence of this more fundamental principle 
of rC. in other words, if this knowledge 
cannot exist other than in the mind, then it 
cannot be transmitted in any physical way 
and, thus, can only be constructed by hu-
man beings in their minds.
one could also take issue with the verb, 
“to learn,” used in both propositions. it is 
entirely too easy to associate learning with 
what is supposed to happen in the folk the-
ory of teaching:
“ …teaching is the presentation of an established 
canon by approved methods for the benefit of the 
deserving.” (dykstra 2005: 54) 
in this folk theory if a teacher presents 
correct elements of a canon of knowledge 
by an approved method and if an intended 
receiver of this transmitted knowledge has 
sufficient mental ability and diligence of 
effort, then the listener will successfully re-
ceive the knowledge into her mind. This is 
a description of the most prevalent use of 
the verb, “to learn,” in English and no doubt 
in other languages with the equivalent verb. 
Hence it seems it is too easy for the average 
reader to “hear” a kind of mixed message in 
Proposition 1. von Glasersfeld expressed 
this distinction between the everyday (real-
ist) use of the verb, “to learn,” and a radical 
constructivist view of the situation in the 
following way:
“ When students can repeat something verbatim, 
it is obvious that they have learned it. Whether 
they have understood it is a question these tests 
avoid.” (Glasersfeld 2001: 2)
This folk theory of teaching, transmit-
ting the canon, does not actually work 
(dykstra 2005). in the sub-division of phys-
ics known as “physics education research” 
(PEr), this conclusion was an important 
early motivation in the development of the 
field.
“ The secondary educational experience does not 
now promote logical thinking in most students… 
if colleges and universities do not try to solve the 
problem by assuming the responsibility for the 
intellectual development of their students, but 
continue to look at their primary purpose as the 
transmission of information about the several 
disciplines, the elementary and secondary schools 
will continue to fail in their mission of truly edu-
cating students.” (McKinnon & renner 1971: 
1051–1052)
“ telling them the correct answers in lucid lec-
tures, explanations, or text presentations is futile. 
This is what has been done before, and it has left 
no trace on the students’ intellects.” (arons 1976: 
835)
notice that McKinnon and renner are 
referring to what is now called “the folk 
theory of teaching” in their indictment of 
traditional instruction when they write, “…
but continue to look at their primary purpose 
as the transmission of information about 
the several disciplines…” Work in this field 
of PEr since the early 1970s continues to 
confirm these observations and reveals that 
alternatives to folk theory teaching make 
significant differences in ways that were 
suggested by McKinnon, renner and arons. 
Examples of some of these alternatives will 
be cited below.
Given the points made so far, a better set 
of basic propositions to “define” rC might 
be:
1 | Knowledge, in the sense of explanation, 
understanding, and meaning, exists 
only in the mind, not in any physical 
form whatsoever, and is intended by the 
knower to fit the evidence of experience 
but can never be known to be a veridi-
cal description of a mind-independent 
reality.
2 | When one becomes aware of a disequili-
bration between one’s existing explana-
tory schemes and one’s new experiences, 
one is moved to restore equilibrium by 
reconstructing the explanatory schemes; 
that is, one adapts one’s explanatory 
schemes to fit experience.1
1 | under certain circumstances, usually 
deemed negative or unnatural, the “offending” 
experiences are avoided, swept under the carpet, 
with the hope that they do not happen again. The 
in these two new propositions intended 
to better define rC, we have the basis for a 
response to the questions raised by the guest 
editors in their editorial. a very short an-
swer is that the scientists and philosophers 
have not experienced sufficient disequilibra-
tion between their existing, realism-based 
explanatory schemes and their experiential 
worlds. until they experience disequilibra-
tion between these two things, there is no 
reason, from a radical constructivist point 
of view, to imagine that realists should have 
any motivation to change what is so funda-
mental in their realist explanatory schemes.
Let us see how these revised proposi-
tions enable us to respond to the questions 
raised by the guest editors.
Why are the advantages  
of Rc not strong enough 
to convince more scientists 
and philosophers?
The short answer is that presenting ad-
vantages of an idea is not what results in 
convincing anyone to change their beliefs. 
There is a very large body of research pub-
lished in refereed journals in physics educa-
tion research (PEr) that shows that present-
ing “better” explanations to students makes 
no significant difference to their concep-
tions of physical phenomena, no matter how 
eloquently the story is told (dykstra 2005) .
There are several sources that consid-
ered together can give an explanation for the 
issue in this question. The theory of cogni-
tive equilibration, devised by Jean Piaget 
and his colleagues at the Center for Genetic 
Epistemology, has something to offer (Piaget 
1985). The philosopher of science, Thomas 
Kuhn, while he was not a radical construc-
tivist but at most a trivial constructivist, 
in his notions of scientific revolution and 
paradigms also has something to offer here 
(Kuhn 1962; Hoyningen-Huene 1993).2 
Piaget was interested in the origins of 
human knowing. He and his colleagues 
result is one of no development and certain de-
structive tensions.
2 | The distinction between trivial construc-
tivisms and radical constructivisms is described 
later in this article.
Ph
il
os
oP
hi
ca
l 
co
nc
eP
ts
 in
 R
ad
ic
al
 c
on
st
Ru
ct
iv
is
m
24
 ConstruCtivist Foundations vol. 6, n°1
found, from the very large quantity of inter-
view transcripts collected over his 60-year 
career, that it is possible to describe the de-
velopment of human reasoning about the 
world in a developmental sequence. More 
importantly to our issues here, he and his 
colleagues developed a theory of cognitive 
equilibration. This theory can be used to ex-
plain how and why human beings develop 
in their reasoning about the world around 
them. it also can be used to explain how, 
why and under what circumstances hu-
man beings construct new, more powerful 
understandings concerning their experien-
tial worlds. The central issue in the theory 
of cognitive equilibration is well-captured 
in the new second proposition defining rC 
given in the introduction.
Kuhn is possibly the most influential 
historian and philosopher of science of the 
20th century. He introduced the notion of 
paradigm and paradigm shift to explain 
large-scale shifts in scientific theories. He 
showed how other psychosocial factors are 
equally as important as rational logic in sci-
entists changing from one theory to another.
Kuhn suggested that there exist para-
digms, which have been established by sci-
entists who recruit others to join them. a 
paradigm is organized around a world-view, 
an explanatory system. The paradigm has 
standard responses to prototypical problems 
addressed by the explanatory system. The 
paradigm becomes a complete, self-con-
sistent package that rationally explains the 
range of experiences considered important. 
other experience is deemed not important 
and unnecessary to explain. The practice of 
checking the prototypical examples to an 
even higher degree of precision is a typical 
activity called “normal science” by Kuhn.
a scientific revolution begins to happen 
when some scientists in the paradigm can no 
longer ignore certain experiences that can-
not be explained by the explanatory system 
of the paradigm. The actual revolution can 
only be recognized in hindsight. Three ex-
amples of such experiences in physics are the 
ultraviolet catastrophe in explaining black 
body radiation, the photoelectric effect, and 
special relativity. none could be explained 
within the prevailing paradigm now known 
as classical physics. initially many held that 
these were minor issues and would even-
tually be figured out within the paradigm. 
But, there were those who decided that they 
could see no way to resolve these issues with-
in the prevailing explanatory system but they 
could see how to explain these “exceptions” 
by abandoning the old explanatory system in 
favor of a new ones, to explain atomic and 
sub-atomic phenomena (quantum physics) 
and to explain gravitational interactions (rel-
ativity), which became foundations of what 
is called “modern physics.” 
While Kuhn was not a radical construc-
tivist, it appears that one can interpret his 
description of scientific revolutions as simi-
lar to Piaget’s theory of cognitive equilibra-
tion and the new propositions describing 
rC given above. However, Kuhn’s idea of a 
paradigm plays a role in explaining resis-
tance to change in explanatory systems. if 
one’s explanatory system already adequately 
explains the experiences one considers sig-
nificant, then there is apparently equilibra-
tion between one’s explanatory knowledge 
and one’s experiences, hence no need or ten-
dency to make any significant adjustments 
to one’s explanatory schemes. This describes 
realists very well. They have no reason to 
think of the world so profoundly differently 
as is required in rC.
to be specific, the dominant paradigm 
we are dealing with is realist. This realism is 
illustrated in the two following descriptions.
“ . . .we postulate the objective existence of physi-
cal reality that can be known to our minds…with 
an ever growing precision by the subtle play of 
theory and experiment.” (de la torre & Zamorano 
2001: 103)
“ The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that 
matches reality in the same sense as you might 
look for paint to match the color that is already 
on the wall you have to repair. in the epistemolo-
gist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns 
him, but some kind of ‘homomorphism,’ which is 
to say, an equivalence of relations, a sequence, or 
a characteristic structure – something, in other 
words, that he can consider the same, because 
only then could he say that his knowledge is of the 
world.” (Glasersfeld 1984: 20–21, emphasis in the 
original)
Within realism the folk theory of teach-
ing completely explains the experience of 
teachers in the classroom. This is what a 
good paradigm does. The teacher’s respon-
sibility is to know the canon correctly and to 
present it using an established method. The 
teacher then checks to see if the students 
“got” what was presented by testing to see if 
they can reproduce what was presented in 
some manner on exams. The students who 
seem to have “gotten” what was presented 
are considered deserving, that is, apparently 
of requisite mental ability and diligence of 
effort. students, who did not “get” what was 
presented, apparently are not deserving, that 
is, do not have the requisite mental abilities 
or even with the requisite mental abilities 
did not work hard enough. 
in this realist paradigm exemplified in 
the folk theory of teaching, all is accounted 
for. There is no disequilibrium. rC attempts 
to describe another explanatory system and 
urge that a realist change paradigms. From 
the realist’s point of view, there is no need 
and the cost of change is too great.
This paints a rather bleak picture for rC’s 
chances against the hegemony of realism 
current today. Yet, when a need is perceived, 
costs can be surmounted. needs, costs…
what are these all about? in this situation we 
are referring to the disequilibration-driven 
need to change one’s explanatory schemes to 
fit new experiences that cannot be explained 
with existing schemes, as in the new Propo-
sition 2 concerning rC given in the “open-
ing” section. such changes in explanatory 
schemes rarely leave one’s whole structure 
of explanatory schemes intact (Carey 1987). 
Changes ripple through the whole network 
as it is adjusted to be internally consistent.
The costs are the costs of change. There 
is the change of certain aspects of one’s self-
image. There is the change in one’s particu-
lar place in the social order in which one 
exists. Ego plays a large role here. if we are 
talking about teaching and learning, there 
are the costs associated with the develop-
ment of a whole new pedagogical practice 
and the consequent development of new 
instructional materials and activities, none 
of which happen in a short period of time 
without any problems. Yet, these costs are 
borne out of necessity because the new ex-
planatory schemes cannot be reversed or re-
scinded. The person has constructed a new 
world with which the old ways are incom-
mensurate and new ways, for example, new 
pedagogical practices, now make perfect 
sense.
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Eric Mazur, a physicist on the faculty 
at Harvard, relates his conversion story 
in print and in presentations. Mazur had 
come across the work of ibrahim abou 
Halloun and david Hestenes (Halloun & 
Hestenes 1985a, 1985b, 1987; Hestenes 
1987). 
“ [a]fter a couple of months of physics instruc-
tion, all students can recite newton’s third law 
and most of them can apply it in numerical 
problems. a little probing, however, quickly 
shows that many students do not understand 
the law. [M]y first reaction was ‘not my stu-
dents…!’ … i decided to test my own students’ 
conceptual understanding, as well as that of the 
physics majors at Harvard.
“ The first warning came when i gave the … test 
to my class and a student asked, ‘Professor Ma-
zur, how should i answer these questions? ac-
cording to what you taught us, or by the way i 
think about these things?’ [t]he results of the 
test came as a shock: the students fared hardly 
better … than on their midterm examination. 
[t]he Halloun and Hestenes test is simple, 
whereas the material covered by the examina-
tion … is, or so i thought, of far greater diffi-
culty.” (Mazur 2007: 3)
surprised that the Harvard students 
fared no better than students at other, less 
prestigious universities on the conceptual 
inventory tests composed by Halloun and 
Hestenes, Mazur decided to compose some 
pairs of exam questions to use in his own 
course. one member of each pair was a 
“simple qualitative question” and the other 
a “more difficult quantitative problem on 
the same physical concept” (Mazur 2007: 
4). Mazur gives an example pair of exam 
questions with the results of scoring the 
students’ performances on the two exam 
items. The students in general did worse on 
the “simple qualitative question” than on 
the “more difficult quantitative problem.” 
These results were repeated throughout 
the course. in a number of cases students 
scored zero on the qualitative question and 
10 out of 10 on the quantitative problem.
Mazur’s initial responses are the fol-
lowing:
“ This simple example exposes a number of prob-
lems one faces in science education. First, it is 
possible for students to do well on conventional 
problems by memorizing algorithms without 
understanding the underlying physics. second, 
as a result of this, it is possible for a teacher, 
even an experienced one, to be completely mis-
led into thinking that students have been taught 
effectively. students are subject to the same mis-
conception: they believe they master the mate-
rial and then are severely frustrated when they 
discover that their plug-and-chug recipe doesn’t 
work in a different problem.” (Mazur 2007: 5)
at about the same time as Mazur was 
first realizing this, another Harvard faculty 
member in education, Howard Gardner, 
was publishing very similar observations.
“ …what an extensive research literature now 
documents is that even an ordinary degree of 
understanding is routinely missing in many, 
perhaps most students. it is reasonable to expect 
a college student to be able to apply in a new 
context a law of physics, or a proof in geometry, 
or the concept in history of which she has just 
exhibited ‘acceptable mastery’ in her class. if, 
when the circumstances of testing are slightly 
altered, the sought-after competence can no 
longer be documented, then understanding – in 
any reasonable sense of the term – has simply 
not been achieved. This state of affairs has sel-
dom been acknowledged publicly…” (Gardner 
1991: 6)
Mazur goes on to point out that a num-
ber of his experiences teaching physics and 
observing the results of physics teaching, 
which his existing explanatory schemes 
did not exactly account for, now fell into 
place with his new explanatory schemes 
about learning. He was moved to devise a 
new pedagogical practice for himself and 
to write about it (see Mazur 2007).
i cannot vouch that Mazur, Gardner, 
Halloun or Hestenes are rC. in fact from 
their other works, from direct interaction 
with them, and interaction with students 
of Hestenes, i can say that neither Halloun 
nor Hestenes would accept rC as a label of 
their views of the nature of knowledge in 
science or in physics education. However, 
this does not disallow a radical construc-
tivist explanation of Mazur’s conversion 
experience. His attention was directed to 
some new evidence he found he could not 
deny. He could not explain this evidence 
using his existing notions of teaching and 
learning physics. His response to his dis-
equilibration was to construct new notions 
of teaching and learning physics, which re-
sulted in a new pedagogical practice.3
it is not a matter of the advantages 
of rC or even what some specific advan-
tages might be. When people are well-
entrenched in the normal science of an 
existing paradigm, it is not sufficient to 
show them a new paradigm and extol its 
virtues. if such folk theory teaching actu-
ally worked, then Mazur and members of 
the PEr community would not find the 
evidence of no change in understanding 
that they have indeed found. Folk theory 
teaching does not result in change in un-
derstanding. it is no surprise, then, that 
the same approach does not work when 
we try to interact with realists about our 
position.
it is not about the logic we present to 
them. safe in their paradigm, everything 
fits the evidence they have. They have to 
perceive flaws in the paradigm themselves, 
that there is undeniable, unavoidable evi-
dence not accounted for by the paradigm. 
in other words, they have to realize for 
themselves a disequilbration between their 
existing notions of the world and new ex-
periences in the world, as Mazur did. dis-
equilibrations drive the need to change 
world-view. Conditions have to be safe for 
them to reconstruct and test their notions 
of the world so that they can proceed to 
do so.
if we wish scientists and philosophers 
to construct for themselves an effective 
understanding of rC, we need to direct 
their attentions, in effective ways, to evi-
dence (new experiences for them) that 
they cannot account for with their existing 
explanatory schemes. and, we must es-
tablish conditions that make it sufficiently 
safe for them work on constructing and 
testing new explanatory schemes.
3 | one rC-based pedagogy has been de-
scribed in some detail (dykstra 2005). it is briefly 
described later in the paper in the section on 
pedagogical objections to rC. Mazur describes 
his pedagogy in (Mazur 2007). 
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can the objections  
to Rc be refuted  
in a way that makes Rc 
more attractive to scientists 
and philosophers?
The short answer to this question is: no. 
in their editorial the guest editors give a list 
of objections frequently expressed about 
rC, which include logical, ethical, social, 
pedagogical and scientific objections. all 
of these objections make perfect sense and 
really are valid, but only from a realist po-
sition, not from the position of rC. it has 
been pointed out that the basic assumptions 
on which realism is based are profoundly 
different than those on which rC is based 
(dykstra 2007). The two philosophical po-
sitions are incommensurate. What is meant 
here by realism is described in quotations by 
de la torre & Zamorano and by von Glasers-
feld in the previous section. von Glasersfeld 
has in several places set forth a description 
of the difference between tradition (realism) 
and rC. Here is one example:
“ What differentiates radical Constructivism 
from the tradition is the proposal unequivocally 
to give up the notion that knowledge ought to be 
a veridical ‘representation’ of a world as it ‘exists’ 
prior to being experienced (that is, ontological re-
ality).” (Glasersfeld 1991: 16)
For the reader who might be a scientist 
or philosopher, it should be noted that a 
highly respected historian and philosopher 
of science still active today, Jammer, suggest-
ed essentially the same thing in 1957, not so 
much to establish a new philosophy, but as a 
result of his examination of the histories of 
ideas in physics.4 in the first two sentences 
below, Jammer writes essentially the same 
notion about the nature of knowledge as 
von Glasersfeld does above. Then, Jammer 
goes on to describe implications for the sta-
tus of explanatory knowledge in science:
“ as a result of modern research in physics, the 
ambition and hope, still cherished by most au-
thorities of the last century, that physical science 
4 | Jammer studied the histories of concepts 
in physics including: force, mass, time, simultane-
ity and quantum theory.
could offer a photographic picture and true im-
age of reality had to be abandoned. science, as 
understood today, has a more restricted objective: 
its two major assignments are the description of 
certain phenomena in the world of experience 
and the establishment of general principles for 
their prediction and what might be called their 
‘explanation.’ ‘Explanation’ here means essentially 
their subsumption under these principles. For 
the efficient achievement of these two objectives 
science employs a conceptual apparatus … This 
conceptual apparatus consists of two parts: (1) a 
system of concepts, definitions, axioms, and theo-
rems, forming a hypothetico-deductive system, as 
exemplified in mathematics by Euclidean geom-
etry; (2) a set of relations linking certain concepts 
of the hypothetico-deductive system with certain 
data of sensory experience. With the aid of these 
relations, which may be called “rules of interpre-
tation” or “ epistemic correlations,” an association 
is set up, for instance, between a black patch on a 
photographic plate (a sensory impression) and a 
spectral line of a certain wavelength (a conceptual 
element or construct of the hypothetico-deduc-
tive system) …
“ The adoption of rules of interpretation intro-
duces … an arbitrariness in the construction of 
the system as a whole … in other words, arbitrary 
modifications in the formation of the conceptual 
counterparts to given sensory impressions can be 
compensated by appropriate changes in the epis-
temic correlations without necessarily destroying 
the correspondence with physical reality. in con-
sequence of this arbitrariness, scientific concepts 
‘are free creations of the human mind and are not, 
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the 
external world.’ (Einstein & infeld, The Evolution 
of Physics, 1938)” (Jammer 1957: 2–4)
one might ask, “What more do the ob-
jectors need?” an appropriate response to 
this question is to point out that until the 
objectors have been able to at least suspend 
their realism-based judgment and have the 
opportunity to construct a different un-
derstanding of the nature of knowing and 
knowledge we know as rC, essentially none 
of what we (or Jammer, Piaget, von Glaser-
sfeld, Ceccato, vico, etc.) have to say in re-
sponse will have any real effect on the objec-
tor’s thinking at all.
We have seen, in the pages of this jour-
nal and in countless debates on-line and at 
meetings, that what we have to say in re-
sponse to the objections has no impact on 
their thinking and they frequently do not 
really hear what we are saying or patently 
refuse to accept the simplest of statements 
we have to offer. We say, for example: We are 
not looking for objective truth. They say in 
response: Yes, you are. You must be. From 
such examples, can it be more clear that they 
only know the world from a realist point of 
view, hence they can only interpret what we 
say from that same point of view?
Going back to the revised Proposition 
1 describing rC, we must recognize that 
neither we, as rC, nor the objectors to rC, 
can in any way receive from outside our-
selves by any physical means an explanation 
of the world either in a realist or a radical 
constructivist way of thinking. We can only 
each construct our own explanations of any 
attempt at communication based on our 
own experiences, not those of the originator 
of the communication signal.
our situation interacting with realists 
appears to be different than the realists’ 
situation. We have a repertoire of at least 
two ways of thinking about knowing. We 
all grew up immersed in a culture in which 
realism is taken as given. augmented by our 
experiences in the rC vs. realism debates, 
we have an understanding of how realism 
works. This understanding of realism is 
necessary. Without this understanding we 
have no way of predicting when a realist 
might find an experience a disequilibrating 
surprise. our understanding of rC enables 
us to imagine possible experiences that can 
be explained by rC but are not explained by 
realism. instead of debaters or combatants, 
we need to be teachers who can use their 
understanding of both rC and realism to 
induce disequilibrations and then facilitate 
constructive responses as the realists at-
tempt to resolve the disequilibrations. The 
answer is not folk theory teaching, realist-
style debates. The answer is rC pedagogical 
practices exercised in the public sphere.
Let us examine possible rC understand-
ing of the five categories of objection and 
consider our understanding in relationship 
to the realism of the objectors.
logical objections
The apparent assumption in these ob-
jections as expressed in the list above is 
that the point of all discussion and debate 
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is to establish the truth of a proposition or 
position. Humberto Maturana presents a 
radical constructivist view of the purpose 
of establishing the truth of a proposition or 
position:
“ Whenever we want to compel somebody else to 
do something according to our wishes, and we 
cannot or do not want to use brutal force, we offer 
what we claim is an objective rational argument.” 
(Maturana 1988: 26)
This rational argument is supported by 
the expectation that “the other cannot re-
fuse what our argument claims because its 
validity as such rests on its reference to the 
real” and the realist claim that “that the real 
is universally and objectively valid because 
it is independent of what we do, and once it 
is indicated it cannot be denied” (ibid: 26).
Furthermore, “whoever does not yield 
to our rational arguments is arbitrary, il-
logical or absurd, [because] we have a privi-
leged access to the reality that makes our 
arguments objectively valid” (ibid: 26).
While this attempt to establish the truth 
need not be accompanied by physical vio-
lence, it is nonetheless psychologically and 
cognitively violent.
The problem with the assumption in the 
objection is that it has no place, no status in 
rC. From the rC position, there can be no 
objective, mind-independent truth attrib-
uted to any explanation. in rC neither the 
realist explanation of knowledge nor the rC 
explanation of knowledge can be argued as 
truth. instead in rC we assess the fit of an 
explanation to the experiential evidence we 
have. Better fit means a better explanation, 
but better fit has no bearing on the truth, 
relative truth or lack of objective truth of 
such an explanation. Because, in the realist 
paradigm, there is only the issue of objec-
tive truth, then anything else just has no 
status. until realists can see things from the 
rC position, this distinction is totally lost 
on them.
technically, realists do not have to 
abandon their old paradigm. But, they do 
need to be able to see how an alternative 
such as rC works and how to use it. still, 
to do this they must disequilibrate over evi-
dence that cannot be explained in their ex-
isting paradigm. revised Propositions 1 & 
2 tell us this.
ethical objections
Here the realist response to the rC posi-
tion that objective truth cannot be known is 
that without objective truth there is no basis 
for decisions with respect to anything. Here 
in particular, with respect to ethics, from 
this realist position rC is the ultimate in 
relativism, a kind of polar opposite to real-
ism. Hence the realist characterization of 
rC: anything goes, laissez-faire. This realist 
characterization of rC is the only alterna-
tive the realist has to objectivism. This is a 
realist construction of the world. sadly, this 
construction does not allow the realist to 
understand rC from within realism.
realists are so focused, by blinders, on 
truth that they fail to hear in rC the part 
about formulating an explanation that fits 
evidence. This means there are necessarily 
limits on explanations in rC, which would 
include ethical theory. The only ideology, 
theory, or explanation that a radical con-
structivist can support is one that fits the 
evidence, experience in the field.5 if that 
happens to be a different ideology than that 
promoted by another as truth, then that per-
son might label the rCs ideology as reac-
tionary, but then the rC could say the same 
about the other. such labels are vacuous and 
non sequitur. 
Yet again, we see in this type of objec-
tion realists who cannot see the world from 
any other position than their own, but this 
is exactly what is necessary for them in or-
der to understand the rC response. revised 
proposition 2 addresses what will be neces-
sary in order for the realists to develop an-
other point of view than the one they are 
working with.
social objections
“Cannot” is quite a different claim than 
“has not,” but “cannot” would logically in-
clude “has not.” The claim, “has not,” cannot 
be applied until all the necessary scholarship 
has been carried out. in fact, there is work in 
sociological studies and in ethics from rC’s 
and related points of view (e.g., Piaget 1995; 
5 | Maturana wrote an extensive document 
that touches both on ethics and social interactions 
(Maturana 1988). There are some small distinc-
tions between Maturana’s position and rC, but 
there is little if any for a radical constructivist to 
disagree within this document.
Maturana 1988).6 Hence, the claim that rC 
cannot explain social structures and society 
is the result of poor scholarship at best.
it is possible that this objection is the 
result of additional poor scholarship. in the 
English-speaking science education com-
munity, Piaget’s work first became known in 
the 1960s. Piaget’s focus was on the origins 
and development of human knowing. in the 
1980s vygotsky’s work was becoming known 
in the English-speaking science education 
community. vygotsky studied the cultural 
influence on learning via established cultur-
al interactions between mother and child, 
teachers and students, children playing with 
each other, etc. Piaget’s work led him to de-
velop a different notion of the nature and 
results of human knowing. vygotsky appar-
ently did not question the accepted realist 
nature of knowledge. Thus, Piaget was rC 
and vygotsky remained realist.
Those who did not understand Piaget 
from the rC point of view found objections 
to Piaget’s ideas. When vygotsky’s work was 
introduced to them, his work easily found 
a home with them. Because of the chrono-
logical order in which they were intro-
duced, many decided that vygotsky came 
after Piaget then extended and corrected his 
work from the individual to the social. This 
misses the points that Piaget was rC and 
vygotsky was realist and that both consid-
ered and studied both individuals and social 
situations. significantly, both Piaget and vy-
gotsky were born in the same year, 1896, but 
vygotsky died in 1934 while Piaget lived and 
worked until 1980.7
6 | in rC all explanatory knowledge exists 
only in the mind. For it to exist there, since it does 
not exist independently of the mind, it must be 
constructed in the mind. it is constructed to fit ex-
perience. This experience can be physical, social 
or internal. in physics we engage students over 
their explanatory knowledge of the experiences of 
the physical “world.” We construct what culture 
and social interactions are to us in the same way 
and for essentially the same reasons as we con-
struct understanding of the physical world. our 
internal experiences are our experiences with our 
own thinking.
7 | What appears here is an abbreviation of a 
more extensive discussion on the work of Piaget 
and its relationship to vygotsky’s work, which can 
be found in Chapter 13 in Fuller et al. (2009).
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While better scholarship on the part of 
all would help resolve this situation with re-
spect to social objections to rC, it is still the 
case that to understand rC work and theory 
in social structures and society, one needs to 
understand the rC position. This can only 
happen if revised Proposition 2 is taken into 
account.
Pedagogical objections
These objections to constructivist teach-
ing are one of the many strategies used to 
discourage people who work in the field 
of education and teacher preparation from 
leaving the folk theory of teaching. While it 
is the case that there may be those who have 
actually advocated and tried to practice 
such idiocy as laissez-faire in the classroom, 
such a notion of teaching and learning is 
distinctly not rC. as was pointed out above, 
in realism there is only truth and not truth, 
maybe in addition something like closer-
to-the-truth, but nothing else. The realist 
reaction to rC, without understanding rC, 
is to assume absolute solipsism and relativ-
ity are what rC is about, hence the anything 
goes or laissez-faire idea. For the realist, 
the notion of unknowable objective real-
ity screams so loudly in the mind that the 
notion of explanation that fits experience is 
completely drowned out. This requirement 
of fit renders any rC pedagogy decidedly 
not laissez-faire.
a more detailed discussion of rC-con-
sistent pedagogy, its contrast with folk-the-
ory (realist) pedagogy and a comparison of 
the learning results of both can be found in 
dykstra (2005). Clearly there is a role for the 
teacher, but that role is not that of presenter 
or arbiter of truth or even what is closer to 
truth, as we can see from the quotations 
from McKinnon & renner and from arons 
in the opening section of this paper. instead 
the assignment of the teacher is to:
  direct the students’ attentions to their 
own conceptions that they apply to a 
new experience to make a specific pre-
diction when this experience does not 
behave as they expect,
  make it safe for the students to construct 
or reconstruct explanatory schemes to 
account for these surprising experi-
ences,
  keep students attending to the fit be-
tween their explanatory schemes and all 
of their experiences subsumed by these 
schemes, and
  engage the students in using the power 
of interactions between each other over 
their ideas and the testing of their ideas 
against the evidence.
again, from this type of objection, we 
see the evidence that rC activities are cri-
tiqued from the traditional realist paradigm. 
our revised Propositions tell us what we 
have to facilitate: the realist must disequili-
brate over a self-identified perception of a 
mismatch between his explanatory schemes 
and his experiences, then work to construct 
and test new explanatory schemes against 
the experiences. RC does not give us any al-
ternative to this.
scientific objections
again, we see in the scientific objections 
to the view that there is no truth, then we 
have no anchor and all is lost. This is real-
ists seeing rC as absolute solipsism and 
total relativism because rC denies that we 
can know the truth of any explanation we 
make up and test against evidence. realists 
apparently know only, and can see nothing 
else but, truth and gradations from true all 
the way to, and only to, not true. For real-
ists, nothing else exists. it is as if they need 
a security blanket of truth to have any idea 
about the physical world.
a second, but equally important, part of 
the objection is buried in the idea that mere 
constructs of individual human minds could 
not possibly be successful at guiding engi-
neers and at having the predictive power the 
scientific community relies upon. This no-
tion is indicative of a kind of destructive elit-
ism amongst many scientists. We, the true 
practitioners of science, are smarter than the 
rest of a society which cannot really under-
stand the science we have figured out.
When a scientist approaches you with 
this elitism, beware. For such a scientist, his 
or her ego is far more important than any-
thing or anyone else. such notions are part 
of the indoctrination into science delivered 
largely via folk theory teaching with its em-
phasis on the notion that only certain people 
are truly deserving or capable of science (cf. 
dykstra 2007: 54).
The problem with these notions for sci-
entists is that for such an idea, science works 
on the basis of discovering truth; there is no 
evidence in all of the history of science that 
any explanatory system survived the chal-
lenges of all subsequent experience with the 
phenomenon in question. This “scientific” 
objection is another failure in scholarship. 
one might think that the designation, 
Ph.d., doctor of Philosophy in a field, would 
require such scholarship. sadly, most Ph.d.s 
today are doctorates in the technical prac-
tice of a field. not only is there no explicit 
philosophy of the field, such philosophy is 
actively shunned, avoided, and discouraged 
in the indoctrination of new scientists.
nonetheless, it is entirely consistent with 
all we know of the history of science when 
we argue that scientists struggle to construct 
explanations that fit the evidence and have 
predictive power. This is entirely consistent 
with the revised Propositions of rC.
one more time, the revised Propositions 
of rC tell us what has to happen in order 
that realists might understand our charac-
terization, our explanations, to see how our 
responses refute their objections. Just as we 
are able to understand how the realist para-
digm works, as well as our own, the realist 
must be able to do the same. our proposi-
tions tell us that disequilibration is required 
of the single-paradigm realist. our only 
hope is to find ways of effectively directing 
the realist’s attention to something that she 
cannot explain from her realist paradigm.
conclusion
The proposal herein to revise the prop-
ositions defining rC in part is an effort to 
emphasize the adjective “radical” proposed 
by von Glasersfeld. He suggested that we 
categorize the constructivisms into two 
groups according to the scholarly meaning 
of the two proposed labels. For constructiv-
isms that depart little, if at all, from the basic 
assumptions of realism, von Glasersfeld pro-
posed the label “trivial”, not in the sense of 
insignificant as a whole, but to mean no real 
shift away from realism in its basic assump-
tions about the nature of knowledge. What 
is meant here by realism is given in several 
places already in this piece. The other cat-
egory of constructivisms makes fundamen-
tal shifts away from the basic assumptions 
about the nature of knowledge at the roots of 
realism. There are profoundly different basic 
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assumptions about the nature and status of 
knowledge at the root of the matter for real-
ism and for rC. von Glasersfeld proposed 
the adjective “radical” in the scholarly sense 
of differentiated at its root from realism, for 
the category of constructivisms that fit this 
description. The quotation given above near 
the beginning of section iii, gives von Gla-
sersfeld’s view on the rC departure from 
realism.
The guest editors suggest that today “the 
literature is populated by a large number of 
different theories, which are often in mu-
tual disagreement, that all label themselves 
as some variety of ‘constructivism.’ They all 
seem to agree with proposition 1, but to a 
much lesser degree with proposition 2” 
(riegler & Quale 2010: 1). Following von 
Glasersfeld’s classification scheme, a con-
structivism that agrees with the original 
proposition 1 but not proposition 2 prob-
ably is not a radical but a trivial construc-
tivism. to accept a consequence of rC does 
not require an acceptance of what neces-
sitates the consequence in the first place. 
such a constructivism, at its heart, can still 
hold that objective truth is knowable and 
that there are right explanations in science 
and philosophy. This is particularly easy 
to discern when one examines a proposed 
“constructivist” pedagogy. among the clues 
for a trivial constructivist pedagogy are 
the notions that student’s conceptions are 
taken as wrong and need to be corrected to 
the right answer, that students discover the 
truth out there in nature, or that students 
must be guided to the truth or right answer 
because they could never figure it out for 
themselves.
in the editorial to this issue, the guest 
editors write: “it appears that the theory of 
rC is simply (too) provocative for many 
people” (riegler & Quale 2010: 2). Why is 
this?” First, one could point out that any 
paradigm would appear provocative if it 
is not understood. Why is rC provocative 
to many people? obviously, many people 
do not understand rC and have never re-
ally experienced coming to see the world 
from another position. This is a very sad 
outcome of the folk theory that passes for 
education.
What is the answer to these problems 
and challenges we face? rC explains not 
only why these problems and challenges are 
happening, but also what can be done about 
them. if we recognize that understanding, 
meaning, and explanation exist only in the 
mind and not in any physical form, then 
we have to accept that our understanding, 
meaning, and explanation cannot be pre-
sented so that others without sufficiently 
similar understanding, meaning, and expla-
nation will “get” what we present. This is no 
different when we are presenting rC than 
when we try to present the meaning of force 
when teaching about newton’s laws. as ar-
nold arons points out above, such presenta-
tions are futile. They leave no impression on 
the intellect of the listener.
What then must we do? rC tells us 
why and under what circumstances people 
change their explanatory schemes for the 
world. They change their explanatory sys-
tems in response to their perception of 
disequilibration between their explanatory 
schemes and their experiences in the world 
in order to restore equilibrium. until this 
re-equilibration happens, people “see” and 
“hear” the world through their previously 
existing explanatory schemes.
if we try to interact with them using 
rC explanatory schemes that do not match 
theirs, it is certain they will not experience 
the interaction from a radical constructivist 
position but from a realist position instead. 
under these circumstances we are doomed 
not to be understood. The listeners have to 
construct for themselves new understand-
ings that sufficiently appear to match our 
rC understanding before we can expect the 
interactions to indicate they are taking our 
contributions to any debates in the radical 
constructivist sense we intend.
again, this is no different than a radical 
constructivist pedagogy in which students 
construct new understandings of motion and 
force (dykstra 2005). The problem in our are-
na is that we do not have the teacher-student 
relationship with our realist colleagues. This 
requires more patience, more persistence, 
and more resourcefulness in creating situ-
ations in which our realist colleagues might 
disequilibrate.
Will rC become mainstream? The skep-
tics first wrote their ideas nearly 2500 years 
ago, although these ideas were probably not 
continuously available in western society 
for that full time. in the Buddhist culture, 
an equivalent philosophy to rC, called “the 
Middle Way,” has also been available for 
2500 years, probably nearly continuously in 
their culture. in neither setting can we call 
rC or the Middle Way mainstream. 
We can safely say that if rC became 
mainstream, the world would be very differ-
ent. Most of us would also agree that if this 
deWey i. dyKstRa, JR.
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were to happen, that different world would 
be a much better place for all to live in.
Why does realism have such hegemonic 
hold? it is impressed on everyone by lan-
guage and our cultural institutions, not the 
least of which today are our schools. rC tells 
us that change in how we see the world can 
happen. We see evidence that there have 
been such changes, at least, in the history of 
science.
Will RC ever become mainstream?
 Not unless we actually use RC instead of 
falling into the realist trap of debates.
If we don’t use what RC tells us  
about change in understanding,
then who will? If not now, when will we try?
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